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Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's
Perspectives on European Integration
To the Reader
"Devising an EU strategy for relations with the new Russia is a chal-
lenge. It calls for a complete break with the perceptions inherited from
the Cold War. At the same time it must be remembered that Russia, in
spite of its current difficulties and the uncertainties of transition, re-
mains a great power in both political and military terms. It would be a
fundamental error to underestimate it.... The West in general, and the
EU in particular, react to events in Russia rather than trying to antici-
pate them. The Western countries have always been fascinated by
Russia but at the same time they do not know how to behave toward
this country which is both very European and very Asian."
1
In my view, the given abstract from a European Parliament report is amaz-
ingly accurate and instructive in reflecting the state of affairs of the EU-
Russia relations.
Much is said and written on this subject,
2 yet it is short of being exhausted.
First, the bilateral relations primarily concern trade or technical assistance,
thus many publications are mainly of a technical or descriptive character.
Second, most of the writing concentrates on the EU perception of Russia,
                                        
1 Report on the Commission Communication entitled 'The future of relations between
the European Union and Russia' and the action plan 'The European Union and Rus-
sia: the future relationship'. Rapporteur: Mrs. Catherine Lalumière. 12 February
1998. A4-0060/98.
2 See the selected references attached to the paper.Igor Leshoukov
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rather than vice versa. Last, much of the paperwork is sooner an exercise in
political correctness, than a sober expertise. One could feel an apparent
need for better comprehension of how the Russians themselves perceive the
historic endeavour of  European integration.
Sir Winston Churchill once pronounced a phrase which has been widely
quoted ever since: "I cannot forecast you the action of Russia. It is a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Regretfully, its final part is often
forgotten: "But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian self-interest."
3
This, in my view, should be a guiding sign for all pundits of the Russian
policy.
Short as it is, this paper does not claim to offer an exhaustive analysis of
the Russian attitudes toward the EU and the integration process. Following
Churchill's advice, I will seek to emphasise a few points that, in my view,
are essential for comprehension of the subject. This genuine attempt aims
to make the Russian moves and intentions understandable (not necessarily
acceptable) to an external observer. I view it as a decent and necessary step
to bridge the gap between the European and Russian perceptions. This is
my aspiration behind this paper.
The Story of Shared Affection
An instant observation would be that Russia is apparently very fond of the
European Union and the process of European Integration. The Russian
leaders and media present the EU exclusively in a favourable light and ad-
mit its essential role in European affairs and the world trade. According to
an official Russian statement, "our country has made a strategic choice in
favour of integration into the world community and, in the first instance,
with the European Union".
4 There is also some speculation about whether
                                        
3 Churchill's comment on Russian-German Pact of 1939.
4 Boris Yeltsin's speech delivered on the occasion of the signing of the Agreement on
Partnership and Cooperation by the European Union and Russian Federation, Corfu,
24 June 1994.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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the EU experience could serve as a pattern in rebuilding the former Soviet
space. The political admiration of the EU policies represents a clear con-
trast to the Russian attitudes toward another major institution in Europe-
NATO, which is still met with continuous mistrust and annoyance. Until
recently Russia persistently underlined the difference between the two in-
stitutions and publicly demonstrated contrasting positions on their respec-
tive plans to enlarge eastwards. This positiveness of the attitude toward the
EU manifests itself at all levels: in Russian political parlance, in the media,
in the easiness with which the Lower Chamber of the Russian Parliament -
the State Duma - ratified the PCA and in the grateful acknowledgement of
economic assistance within Tacis. Russian politicians even went as far as to
explicitly suggest an idea that at a certain stage Russia might join the Euro-
pean Union.
5 Even though it looked highly unrealistic, the EU was appar-
ently puzzled by such statements and kept wondering what the enigmatic
Russians might be up to. It gave rise to many speculations about whether
the Russians really understood what the EU is and about what their real
attitude toward the whole process is.
Indeed, while Russia's attitude toward European integration is still rather
positive, the overall picture is much more complex and needs further re-
flection. There are various problems lurking behind, and no sort of political
change can be excluded under the horrifying crisis into which the country
has now plunged itself. Russia has always lacked the vision of what it
would like to get from the EU; now it is on the cross-roads.
It is virtually impossible to find an official Russian document defining the
country's policy vis-à-vis European integration and its politics. As a sub-
stitute, I propose to refer to Primakov's speech at the EU-Russia Coopera-
tion Council in Brussels on January 27
th, 1998. From this document we can
deduce the following guidelines in contemporary Russian policy with re-
gard to the EU:
                                        
5 First it was expressed by the President Yeltsin sometime in the Autumn 1996, then it
was repeated by the Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin during his visit to Brus-
sels, July 1997.Igor Leshoukov
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1) The overall aim of Russia's policy is to seek establishment of an all-
European economic space without barriers between the two biggest in-
tegration projects - the CIS and the EU.
2) Russia strongly advocates its acknowledgement as a «market economy»
as a means to minimise the EU anti-dumping measures that cause a
heavy loss of profits and undermine future cooperation.
3) Russia shall concentrate on the implementation of the PCA, especially
regarding its economic provisions. Some specific issues shall be given
priority, e.g. President Yeltsin's initiative on managers' training, coop-
eration with the EU in the field of combatting organised crime, drug
trafficking and money laundering.
The wording is as positive as ever, nevertheless, certain points require at-
tention. First of all, Russia will become more reserved toward the EU en-
largement. From now on, diplomatically speaking, Russia shall "carefully
follow" the process of EU enlargement. The Cooperation Council proposed
regular consultations between the two sides to relieve potential concerns
about access of Russian exporters to the CEE markets. One could observe
the growing Russian discontent and anxiety that EU enlargement will hurt
the commercial interests of the third parties, that Russia might need "com-
pensation" for the anticipated losses arising from the introduction of the
Euro. Now that the Founding Act with NATO has been signed, the political
necessity to juxtapose the "military" NATO and "economic" EU is sub-
stantially diminished. The recent economic and political crisis in Russia has
called into question the entire strategy of the reforms. Only yesterday, Rus-
sia hailed the EU without questioning its worth, today Russia is divided in
its assessments of gains and losses. The future is vague and highly ques-
tionable. At best, I could predict a much more sober attitude toward the EU
and its lessons.
Politics, in my view, is always a combination of a variety of factors like
pragmatics and emotions, interests and past legacies. So let us go beyond
the rhetoric and face the reality of Russia's perspectives on the EU. For
analytical purposes I propose to differentiate between two dimensions inBeyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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the Russia-EU relationship.
The first one reflects the obvious fact that the Russia-EU relationship pri-
marily concerns trade and other issues of commercial importance. It is im-
portant to understand what it means for Russia to have the EU as a major
trade partner and what stands beyond the impressive figures. The second
dimension is primarily political and concerns Russian feelings and expec-
tations underpinning their relations with Europe and the EU as its main in-
stitution.
The Topsy-Turvy Nature of Economic Realities
There are a number of well-known facts about Russian relations with the
EU which are often cited. It became common to report that the European
Union is "by far Russia's largest trading partner". Indeed, the EU receives
40% of Russian exports and provides 38% of its imports, as compared to
5% of Russian external trade turn-over with the US.
6 As expected, the Rus-
sian imports to the EU will exceed 50% after the EU has enlarged east-
wards. The EU exports to Russia are annually growing by 10%. The EU
exports to Russia (ecu 23bn)
7 are bigger than those to China (ecu 13bn) and
approach those to Japan (ecu 27bn), which is the second trade partner of
the EU. Two thirds of the enterprises with Russian participation are located
in the EU. It is easy to continue further recording the achievements, though
this might be seriously misleading.
No doubt, the EU is one of Russia's most important commercial partners,
yet some Russian economists are not particularly happy about the dynamics
in bilateral relations. They note that Russian trade with the EU is of an
asymmetric character and this has a negative effect on the future develop-
ment of Russia. Let us follow their logic and have a closer look at the bilat-
                                        
6 These figures could be found in all official briefings and public statements.
7  Russia ranks sixth in terms of EU imports and fifth as regards EU exports.Igor Leshoukov
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eral trade relations.
8
1. The pattern of trade is unsatisfactory. One third of the Russian exports to
the EU comprises raw materials and minerals (mostly natural gas and
oil), another third is metal and wood products. On the other hand, one
third of the Russian imports originating from the EU comes to the coun-
try for consumption purposes. One argues that if Russia continues to de-
velop this way it will have no future. The country is just «eating» its
natural resources while killing the economic growth and domestic manu-
facturers. All other problems reveal more specific symptoms of the same
disease.
2. The goods nomenclature is narrowing. Even the previewed quotas are
not fulfilled by Russia (for instance, the agreed steel quota has been cov-
ered only for 80%).
3. There was a 20% increase in exports in 1995 and only 8% in 1996. Im-
port growth slowed to 12% in 1996 from 24% in 1995.
9
4. The balance of the turn-over is still positive, but the tendency is toward a
continuous decrease. The logical inference is that Russia risks having a
negative balance in its foreign trade. Given the problems of collecting
tax revenues, how will the government finance its currency debts and the
crumbling budget?
If the premises are correct, the overall conclusion is rather pessimistic. The
structure and proportions of trade between the sides are not promising and
well below the expectations of the Russian side who aimed to achieve the
pattern of trade between developed countries that is based on products of
                                        
8  Interviews at the RF Representation by the EU and DGIA of the European Commis-
sion, Brussels, July 1998. See also: Y. Borko, 'The New Intra-European Relations
and Russia' in M. Maresceau (ed.), Enlarging the European union. London: Long-
man, 1997, pp. 385-6.
9 'Europe, Russia and the World Trading System'. Speech given by Sir Leon Brittain,
Vice-President of the European Commission to the Duma of the Russian Federation,
Moscow, Tuesday 17
th July 1997.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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high added value. The asymmetry in trade is exacerbated by the continuous
slowdown in the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). With the deep-
ening of the current financial crisis this picture looks much gloomier.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
Today the bilateral relations are structured in the form of the Agreement on
Partnership and Cooperation (PCA)
10.
 Concluded in Corfu in June 1994
after eight rounds of tough negotiations and duly ratified, it came into force
in December 1997
11.
As usual, let us start by reporting the achievements. The PCA is one of the
most detailed and advanced documents with a western institution ever
signed. It provides the legal and political framework for the relationship
between the EU and Russia. The document comprises 112 articles, ten an-
nexes, two protocols and a number of joint declarations, unilateral declara-
tions and correspondence
12. As stated in the Art. 1, the agreement inter alia
aims "to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations
between the Parties", "to support Russian efforts to consolidate its democ-
racy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition to a market
economy", "to provide an appropriate framework for the gradual integra-
tion between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe", "to create
the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area
between the Community and Russia covering substantially all trade in
goods between them, as well as conditions for bringing about freedom of
establishment of companies, of cross-border trade in services and of capital
movements" and many other very positive goals.
13 In terms of liberalisation
                                        
10  For the text of the PCA see: COM (94) 257 final.
11  In the meantime, the Interim Agreement signed in July 1995 which came into force
in February 1996 was operational. For its text see: OJ L 247/1 (1995).
12 For an initial EU analysis of the PCA see: What is the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement? A Short Guide to the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Signed
in Corfu on 24th of June by the European Union and Russian Federation. DG IA.
International Symposium, Moscow, Nov. 1994.
13  Art. 1, PCA.Igor Leshoukov
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of trade, the PCA confirmed the MNF (Most Favoured Nation) status for
Russia that had been originally granted to the Soviet Union under the 1989
Agreement on Trade and Commercial Economic Cooperation (TCA). Fur-
thermore, the EU opened for Russia access to the GSP (Generalised System
of Preferences) regime which offers tariff reductions for certain types of
goods. This enumeration is again rather impressive, yet it is useful to check
its substance and relevance.
First, the basic fact that Russia primarily exports its natural resources leads
us to a regretful conclusion. If this pattern of trade between the sides con-
tinues (and the current tendency unfortunately supports this assumption),
then Russia shall not need any agreement at all. These types of goods are
not subject for any levies under the Community legislation. For instance,
even disregarding the GSP, 83% of imports from Russia to the EU are
free.
14
Second, there has long been a declared Russian government intent to join
the WTO. Given that the PCA trade provisions are based on the
GATT/WTO requirements, the realisation of this intent will make many
parts of the PCA obsolete. For the sake of truth, under the current crisis and
the change of government, this perspective seems extremely unlikely.
Third, the arrangements for the so-called "sensitive products" are only par-
tially sorted out. The specific agreement on the steel regime was signed in
October 1997. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Russia is not able to fill the quota.
After a long controversy over carpet quotas in March 1998, an arrangement
on textiles was reached
15. However, it does not leave much possibility for
the revival of local manufacturers. Now the textile production is five times
                                        
14 D1A paper entitled "Toward greater economic integration. The European Union's
financial assistance and investments for the New Independent States" (Sept. 1996).
15 The previous agreement on trade in textile products between the European Commu-
nity and Russian Federation was concluded in the form of an Exchange of Letters
was concluded on 19 December 1995 and expired on 31 December 1996. The new
agreement between the sides has been initialled on 28 March 1998 and provided for
elimination of quantitative restrictions for an agreed list of products, see the Com-
mission Regulation (EC) No 729/98 of 31 March 1998.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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as low as that of 1990 and the country now is a net importer of textiles.
There are debates over access to the Trans-Siberean air corridor where the
Russian air carriers, unable to compete with European companies, are
steadily losing passengers. Another classical subject is the Russian export
of fusil materials. This was, along with some banking sector regulations,
one of the main obstacles that had delayed the signing of the EU-RF PCA.
The agreement on fusil materials was originally expected to be reached be-
fore January, 1
st 1997, yet it is still pending. The official EU position is
based on the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and advocates the necessity
to avoid an "excessive dependency" on a given importer. The Russian side
does not consider these motivations satisfactory and is trying to get access
to this profitable market.
Additionally, the PCA lies rather low in the EU hierarchy of international
agreements. It is less preferential than the arrangements with the ACP (Af-
rican, Caribbean and Pacific) countries
16, not to mention the Association
agreements with CEE countries
17. It clearly reflects the differentiated ap-
proach of the EU toward the former Socialist block and in some respects
contradicts the honeyed words about the "strategic partners for peace, sta-
bility, freedom and prosperity in Europe" who "share a responsibility for
the future of the continent and beyond"
18.
Last but not least, one of the key elements of the PCA is the "FTA rendez-
vouz clause". It implies that by the end of 1998 the sides will have started
consultations concerning the establishment of the Free Trade Area between
Russia and the EU. An FTA was provided under "Europe agreements" and
missing in the PCA with NIS. Initially, there was a strong Russian intention
to overcome this differentiation embedded in the EU treatment. Now with
the world turned upside down, the creation of an FTA with the EU seems
unrealistic and not even desirable for the Russian side. The export and im-
                                        
16  Lomé Agreements.
17 Europe agreements.
18 Press Release (Pres/98/15) of the first meeting of the Cooperation Council between
the EU and the Russian Federation, Brussels, 27 January 1998.Igor Leshoukov
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port levies give the Russian government 35% of the budget income. Given
the fact that the EU share is about 40% of the Russian external trade and
considering that under the WTO rules the average level of external duties
may not be increased, the creation of an FTA between the EU and Russia
will inevitably cause a severe cut in customs duties and, subsequently, in
budget earnings. The budgetary losses estimated at 14% are not acceptable
and, under the current conditions, simply not affordable. This economic
reality makes one of the underlying provisions of the Agreement irrelevant.
If we assume that Russia's original objective in the negotiations with the
EU was to agree on terms equal to those offered by the EU to the CEE
countries under the Europe Agreements, it could be argued that the Russian
Federation has clearly failed. As some of the scholars rightfully note, the
current PCA does little more than extend GATT/WTO rules to Russia,
which is not a member, whereas the EAs provide for full economic inte-
gration.
19 The pre-accession strategies pursued in the applicant countries
contribute to the widening and deepening of this differentiation in treat-
ment. There is no consensus in Russia as to where to develop economically
provided that it is viable. In this respect, the PCA's potential for further up-
date is unclear. The establishment of an FTA between Russia and the EU,
as well as Russia's accession to the WTO, looks unlikely. The tendency to-
ward growing differentiation between Russia and the rest of Europe entails
a risk of "normative divide", and heightening feelings of isolation in Rus-
sia. As a result, the conflicting images - the European one of Russia as not
pushing for the reforms, and the Russian one of the EU as discriminating
Russia - will serve the function of a self-fulfilling prophecy. This brings us
back to the cold ages of divided Europe.
Anti-dumping
Another controversial problem about Russian relations with the EU has al-
                                        
19 B. Ardy, 'Economic Relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern
Europe: The effect of trade preferences on the Russian Federation'. Paper presented
at the conference 'Ten Years of Cooperation: the European Union and Russia in per-
spective', St. Petersburg, 5-6 June 1998.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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ways been the anti-dumping measures initiated by the European Commis-
sion against key items of Russian exports, such as is well known, for ex-
ample, art. 113(1) EEC provides for the exclusive powers for the Commu-
nity with regard to the commercial policy (CCP). The EU rules in this field
are based on the GATT Subsidies Code, which postulates that "a product
shall be considered to have been dumped if its export price to the Commu-
nity is less than the normal value of the product"
20. The concept of the
normal value is a core principle for anti-dumping evaluations and under-
stood as "the comparable price actually paid or payable in the ordinary
course of trade for the like product intended for consumption in the ex-
porting country or country of origin"
21. In the event of a state-trading
country (as was the case with the USSR) the "normal value" can not be
objectively assessed and there arises a problem of "price-comparability"
22,
when an analogue country should be arbitrarily defined, the point which
leads to an alleged discrimination against Soviet/Russian products.
In spite of the official references to the Russian Federation as an "economy
in transition", which is also reflected in the PCA, the country has been le-
gally treated as "a non-market economy", preserving the discriminatory
import regime on Russian products
23. In April 1998 the number of anti-
dumping procedures in the Russia-EU trade amounted to fourteen. The di-
rect losses (lost profits) are estimated by the Russian side at ecu 220mn.
24
Anti-dumping relates only to 1% of Russian exports, but it comprises 10%
of the manufactured goods. Thus it is much more important than the gen-
eral figures and it has negative effects on the development of the relations
(indirect risks).
                                        
20 Art. 2(2) Council Regulation (EEC) 2176/84.
21 Art. 2(3) Council Regulation (EEC) 2176/84.
22 F. Jacobs, 'Anti-dumping procedures with regard to imports from Eastern Europe' in
M. Maresceau (ed.), The Political and Legal Framework of Trade Relations between
the European Community and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, pp. 291-
308.
23  See for instance the XVIth Annual Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament on the Community's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy activities.Igor Leshoukov
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Russia and EU assistance
There are three major types of assistance provided by the EU and aimed to
facilitate the reform process in Russia. These are humanitarian and food
aid, technical assistance, as well as credits and credit guarantees. The assi-
stance that commands most of the attention is the EU Tacis initiative
25
which is generally presented as "an unmatched technical assistance pro-
gram"
26 offered to Russia to support the transition process. Between 1991
and 1995, a sum of ecu 2290 mn was allocated within a series of project
initiatives (human resources development, restructuring of enterprises,
transport and telecommunication infrastructures, energy and environmental
protection, food production and distribution)
27. It is much lower, however,
as compared with the technical assistance provided for the CEECs. The
Phare budget amounts to over ecu 1bn and that of Tacis is ecu 0,5bn. Thus,
the non-repayable aid per capita received during the period of 1991-95 un-
der Phare was ecu 54,3 in the Czech Republic, ecu 52,3 in Bulgaria, ecu
27,6 in Poland. Conversely, during the period of 1991-94, Russia received
only ecu 5,4 per capita.
28 This makes a five- to tenfold difference in the
concentration of aid between Russia and its former allies within
COMECON.
In spite of its benevolent intentions, the Tacis program soon became an
easy scapegoat for criticism from various perspectives. First, as inadequate
to meet the challenges of the transformation process in such a huge country
                                                                                                                       
24 Author's interview in the Russian representation by the EU, Brussels, July 1998.
25 Initially, a "technical assistance for the CIS countries and Mongolia" (TACIS), now
it is the Community initiative for the New Independent States and Mongolia (Tacis).
26 Ottokar Hahn, the EU Ambassador to Russia, in his speech at a conference "Ten Ye-
ars of Cooperation: the European Union and Russia in perspective", St. Petersburg,
5-6 June 1998.
27 Mrs. Lalumière's Report. Op.cit.
28  J. Gower and B. Ardy, 'The European union and Russia. Partnership and Cooperati-
on: A Comparison with Policy toward Central Europe.' Paper presented at the confe-
rence 'Forty Years after the Rome Treaties: European Integration and Russia', St.
Petersburg 6-7 June, 1997.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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as Russia. Second, for its complicated bureaucracy and shortcomings in
implementation. Third, for the ineffective use of the allocated funds, whe-
reas about 10% go as kickbacks and the bulk of the earnings feed into the
pockets of foreign consultants
29. The European Parliament report notes that
"the cooperation and aid policy geared to promote a Western market eco-
nomy has recently come up against severe criticism in Russia. The reasons
have to do with the general mentality: citizens of a great power which not
so long ago was promoting world revolution consider it humiliating to be
the recipients of aid. Moreover, practical experience in the way in which
the market economy operates in Russia is perceived to be unfavourable by
most of the population: goods are available, but there is no money to buy
them. Now that the socialist system of controls has broken down, the ordi-
nary citizen is faced with a precarious social and economic situation and
insecurity stemming from crime. The people believe these phenomena to be
the consequences of capitulation to market forces and Western control. Gi-
ven, in addition, that many Western aid operations have failed, the attitude
to the West has become less friendly."
30
Since the summer of 1998, the situation has become less promising for the
improvement of the EU image and the relationship between the parties. The
Russian government defaulted on internal debts which caused heavy losses
for foreign investors. Further default by the country on its external debts is
still anticipated. The population lost about two thirds of its income through
the devaluation of the Ruble and inflation. The overwhelming crisis ques-
tions the basics of the economic strategy applied during recent years. The
dilemma is whether Russia should continue its integration into the world
                                        
29 'Die unbedarfte Helfer', Spiegel 38/98 of 14.09.1998.
30  Mrs. Lalumière's Report. Op.cit. Compare it with the findings of the Ogilvy's Report
on Information Dissemination of Tacis (Agriculture and Food Sector in St. Peters-
burg Region, 1995): 'An overwhelming majority of those surveyed (nearly 80%) be-
lieve that contacts between Russia and the west should be on the basis of "mutually
advantageous cooperation". Aid and assistance programmes attract very low support
(about 6% each). In essence this could be taken to indicate that Russians would like
to trade their way out of their current situation. Nearly 50% of the sample believe
that aid is unnecessary". Ogilvy Adams. Interim Report, January 1995.Igor Leshoukov
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economy and further implement the Western/European principles or
whether it should follow its own way, i.e., close the borders and concen-
trate on its own interests defined as a protectionist support for local Russian
industry and Russian manufacturers. The question, although it has enor-
mous economic consequences, is primarily political. This is the second part
of my analysis.
EU the unrespected giant
When transferring our attention from economics to politics it is useful to
put the given subject into a broader context. Subsequently, a basic question
arises: where does the EU and its integration policy stand within Russia's
policy priorities?
The profound shocks and upheavals of Perestroika have affected both do-
mestic and foreign policy and the identification of priorities. The elite and
the general public are divided on virtually all issues. The dominant anxie-
ties include concerns about the ways to maintain the territorial integrity of
the country and to control regional separatism, and how to overcome the
deepening financial and political crises that seriously endanger the coun-
try's future. Under these conditions, any of the international issues are un-
derstandably given secondary importance. The 1998 economic and political
crisis - the collapse of the major banks and the local currency, the jump in
inflation, comparable only to the early 1990s - nearly deprives any other
issue of genuine attention. Today, when the very survival of the political
and economic system in its current form is at stake, the time is simply not
right for anything else. Even from the technical point of view, the pro-
longed government crisis and confusing changes in its structure
31 do not
provide viable footing to formulate a state policy. Even before the recent
shocks, not much attention had been given to the EU and the process of
European integration. If we follow the Duma debate, the speeches of Presi-
                                        
31 For instance, the Ministry of External Economic Relations responsible for the eco-
nomic cooperation with the EU has once been dissolved, then it was re-established
again.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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dent Yeltsin, statements by Minister Primakov, we can observe that the EU
and the integration process in Europe is hardly mentioned.
The list of priorities is certainly arbitrary. In my view, it could be described
as a limited number of issues rotating around in a carrousel. Among those
one could find the relationship with Ukraine and Belorussia, the unrest in
Caucasus and the Caspian Oil, the Russian communities in the Baltics,
Tadjikistan, NATO's enlargement, the Yugoslav crisis and a few others.
European integration does not belong to this list. I can argue that in the new
Russia the political attention is primarily given to problematic and trouble-
some issues, whereas the EU, allegedly not a big trouble-maker, is often
overlooked. There are also other considerations which contribute to a low
profile of European integration issues in Russian politics.
1. Relations with the EU are regarded as primarily issues of economics and
trade and, subsequently being of a technical nature, do not require politi-
cal attention.
2. The Russian authorities find it difficult to grasp the complex EU ma-
chinery, its political nature, its capacities and functions. The post-Soviet
mentality fed upon by the "great power" legacy is not compatible with
the real meaning of the EU's structural principles such as "supranational-
ity", "acquis communautaire", or "subsidiarity". Russia has traditionally
oriented itself to bilateral relations only with those whom it viewed as
equal partners like Germany, Britain and France in Europe. In this per-
spective, Russia does not feel enough reverence for the EU, the political
beast of unknown nature.
3. It is important to recall a trite fact - Russia is not and will hardly ever be
a member of the European Union. The EU is a very complicated political
creature. Even the internal actors are sometimes at a loss and unable to
take in the whole complexity of the phenomenon. Although European
integration started as an elite business, now it has become a subject of
public concern. People in the EU Member States realise that the EU is
there: the standard form of passports, Brussels regulations, European
elections, worries about the single currency and so forth. For the RussianIgor Leshoukov
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people European integration is something different and has little to do
with their lives. The situation may slightly change if the Euro is traded
as an international reserve currency and the Russians start hunting for it
to safeguard their savings. Today, European integration is a very remote
issue, something which is far away and of not much practical relevance.
As a result, the level of public awareness about the EU issues is ex-
tremely low.
4. One of the shortcomings of  Russian reform has been the lack of atten-
tion to new ideology formation. A true sense of democracy and proce-
dures is still unfamiliar in Russia's political culture. The way the reforms
proceed is rather specific and does not provide for a European-
compatible political culture. Contemporary Russia has not been able to
develop a political culture that might be compatible with European stan-
dards. The Russians, both the government and the public at large, have
never seriously considered the European integration as an identity model
to follow.
This is Russia's perspective on the sacred European question about whether
the EU is a «dwarf» or a «giant» in political terms. As a summarising re-
mark, I can note that the issues about European integration experience an
apparent lack of visibility and political respect in Russia. I am convinced
that this lack of political attention plays more of a negative rather than a
positive role in defining Russian policy vis-à-vis the EU.
The next step is to define what factors shape Russia's attitudes toward
European integration. In general, Russia's perspective on the EU is an in-
terplay between international and domestic policy considerations. The
space provided does not permit me to present a structured and theoretical
analysis, so  I will confine myself to an overview of these factors. On the
one hand,  Russian policy is a response to what it has been offered from the
EU. On the other hand, it reflects the country's international priorities. Ad-
ditionally, it is shaped by domestic concerns and inspirations. Some of
these factors are of specific relevance to the EU, others have a broader ap-
plication, yet to an essential effect for our issue.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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The Background and Old Legacies
The Russian Federation  declared itself  the official successor state to the
Soviet Union. An implicit interpretation of Russia as the political heir to
the USSR reveals a queer background of the country's commitments re-
sulting from this legal procedure. This creates the problem of continuity
and discontinuity in Russia's political conduct. In other words, this means
that one should neither overlook the old elements in the new Russia, nor
overestimate their impact. This does not imply that Russia will automati-
cally follow suit. It simply makes reason briefly look at the historic dy-
namics of the relationship between the USSR/Russia and the European
Communities.
When the European integration process started in the 1950s and the first
Communities, especially the EEC, were established, the Russian response
was rather negative. The form chosen by Europe for its political consolida-
tion was considered undesirable and even threatening to Soviet interests.
For a few decades, with a slight difference in ideological assessment, the
Russians viewed European integration as performing a function similar to
that of the political-military cooperation within NATO, namely, to contain
the Russian influence in Europe and to buttress  hateful capitalism.
32 Some
academic experts viewed the Communities' experience as an attractive eco-
nomic strategy to follow, yet under Soviet rule, public discussions were not
feasible, let alone the dreams of making it operational.
33 Antipathy is
usually reciprocal, and the European Commission had as many reservations
toward the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (SMEA or
                                        
32 Even the titles of Russian publications over that period are rather instructive. See for
instance, V. Knjazhinski, The Political Strategy of Anti-Communism. A Historical
Overview of the Imperialist Politics of European Integration. Moscow, 1969 or an
earlier writing by the same author which sound today quite peculiar: V. Knjazhinski.
A Failure of the Plans to Consolidate Europe. Moscow, 1958.
33 See Y. Borko. 'Evolution of the views on European integration in the USSR and Rus-
sia: political and academic approaches' in I. Leshoukov et al. (eds.), Forty Years of
the Rome Treaties: European Integration and Russia. St. Petersburg, 1998, pp.18-28.Igor Leshoukov
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COMECON).
 34 Some adjustments in bilateral relations were introduced in
the early 1970s when a temporary rapprochement between the two systems
took place.
35 After that, a new heat wave in the Cold War
36 ruined these
early hopes to normalise the relationship. It was not until the late 1980s
when the USSR started to search for a new identity under Gorbachev's in-
itiative of Perestroika that the sea change had come. The first agreements
signed
37, the Russian establishment introduced a very favourable assess-
ment of European integration and its policies. This was one of the manife-
stations of the general improvement of East-West relations. Mr. Gorbachev
had offered the concept of a "common European home" and rather consi-
stently pursued the bandwaggoning tactics in an attempt to incorporate
38
Soviet policies into the Western guidelines. For better or worse, this stra-
tegy went bankrupt and a few years later the Soviet Union and its last lea-
der Gorbachev left the political scene. Russia under President Yeltsin soon
turned to a more reserved approach toward the West.
With the benefits of hindsight, I can argue that Russia's attitude toward the
phenomenon of European integration tends to mirror the country's relation-
ship with the West. When the ideological and the political-military con-
frontation between the West and the East was high, no pragmatic assess-
ment of European integration was feasible. When the first improvement
                                        
34  In early 1970-s the Commission tried to establish formal links with the USSR, howe-
ver this attempt resulted in failure.
35  The 1972 the Treaty of Rome was signed, Leonid Brezhnev accepted the EC as "an
objective reality and the first contacts between the European Commission and the
USSR and SMEA were established. A few Socialist countries joined the GATT.
However, it was a period of an uncompleted recognition. For more details see: P.
Benavides, 'Bilateral relations between the European Community and Eastern Euro-
pean countries: the problems and prospects of trade relations' in M. Maresceau (ed.),
The Political and Legal Framework of Trade Relations between the European Com-
munity and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp.21-25.
36  Primarily, the result of the Western accusation of the USSR's involvement in Afgha-
nistan affairs and the double decision of NATO.
37  Declaration on the Mutual recognition, the TCA between the EU and the USSR.
38  Some researchers perceive it as subordination. See Ph. Zelikov, 'The Masque of In-
stitutions', Survival, 38:1(1996), pp.6-18.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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was reached and the Helsinki process started, the first chances for normali-
sation emerged, but the time was not ripe. Only under Mikhail Gorbachev
did the cooperation between the EU and USSR/Russia become possible.
Thus, Russia's perspective of the EU has always been subordinate to the
general state of the country's relations with the West, to the peculiarity and
the mood of these relations.
The Story of Good and Bad Boys
The Russian Federation under President Yeltsin has chosen a more re-
served position vis-à-vis the West. Inter alia, Russia has put forward its
strong reservations against the enlargement of NATO. It has started to
clearly differentiate between the Atlantic Alliance and the EU with regard
to their missions in Europe. The first one was regarded as a potentially
threatening institution whose extension to former East European socialist
countries would lead to "new dividing lines" in Europe and the rebirth of
"block thinking". The latter was presented as a benign economic concilia-
tion pursuing exclusively commercial interests. The Russian Federation
persistently denies its assent to the extension of NATO, but welcomes EU
enlargement. The two points are striking. First, it is a clear break from pre-
vious Soviet assessment of the two institutions. Second, many experts
agree that there is a conceptual linkage between the enlargement of the EU
and of NATO
39. Both the EU and NATO have evolved into the main insti-
tutions of contemporary Europe. These were the two institutions, though
different, that created a consolidated Europe in its current form. They have
been acting hand in hand in solving strategic and everyday problems,
sometimes not without overlap, though contributing to each other. In the
post-Cold War environment they have extended out further as leading in-
stitutions in Europe to define its future architecture, naturally comple-
menting each other in various ways.
                                        
39  See, for instance, K. Voigt, 'NATO enlargement: sustaining the momentum', NATO
Review 44:2, 1996.Igor Leshoukov
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How can one interpret Russia's acceptance of one while remaining suspi-
cious of the other? Is it based on a rational calculation of political options
or is it more related to psychology and past experiences? Is it a long term
tendency, or is it just a temporary tactic which could be dropped at any
moment? I would like to offer a few lines for analysis.
The US as Russia's reference
As demonstrated before, Russia's attitudes toward European integration can
not be severed from its general approach to the West. Europe has never
been a separate reference in Russian politics. Offending as it may sound for
the Europeans,  Russia's main reference has always been the United States.
It is a result of a 'strategic interdependence' between the two main nuclear
powers in political and military terms.
40 Today's Russia does not regard the
US as its main adversary, nor do the Russians have the Americans for true
and reliable friends. Certain antagonism and apprehensions still persist,
though modified. Russia eagerly accepts American money, enjoys Holly-
wood films, still it steadily opposes American leadership. The bulk of po-
litical discourse about the "multi-polar world" apparently covers a clear
political strategy to prevent or at least to undermine the United States' lead-
ership. This has had a great impact on Russia's perspective of the integra-
tion process in Europe. The Russians tend to overestimate its "counter-
American" nature, while overlooking the origins and future tendencies of
the phenomenon. The concept of the Euro-Atlantic community is carefully
omitted in political debates in Russia. Russia welcomes full-heartedly
every European initiative which they interpret as a project to counter
American domination. Thus, EU issues are essentially of secondary nature
for Russian politics. They are viewed sooner as instrumental than as having
a value of their own. As a manifestation of such an approach, the Russian
expectations of the EMU are related to the creation of a more symmetric
currency structure of world finance, rather than to the calculation of gains
and losses resulting from the introduction of a single currency.
                                        
40 Alexandrova, O.: 'Strategische Partnerschaft' aus russischer Sicht. Bericht des BIOst
24/1997.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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Russia in Search of Itself
"Who in the world am I? Ah, that's the great puzzle!"
41, Alice once wonde-
red while in Wonderland. In a similar way, one could be puzzled while re-
flecting on the subject of what Russia is today and what it wishes to be.
The identity crisis which Russia is experiencing today is comparable to the
circumstances when previous historic decisions on the direction of the
country's development were taken in the 15th, then in the early 18th and in
the first quarter of the 20th centuries. The resolution of this dilemma will
define the development of the country in the coming millennium. What
kind of Russia do the Russians themselves want to live in? Does Russia
need to regain the world ambitions of the Soviet Empire? What should pre-
vail, the democratic and civil societal values, or the primacy of state and
international respect should it ever be achieved through autocracy and
military might? The answers to these questions are not clear, especially af-
ter the dramatic events of 1993 when  liberalism in Russia was substan-
tially undermined. Great uncertainties and disagreements produce a politi-
cal situation aggravated by an unfavorable intellectual atmosphere.
42 The
internal confusion about the country's fate inevitably affects its relationship
with the outside world, first of all with Europe.
Democratic freedom has gained a lot owing to the major shifts in
USSR/Russia politics, inspired by Gorbachev's reforms. At the same time
the country has been unprecedentedly marginalised in world affairs
43. The
debate between those who advocate further opening to the West and those
                                        
41  L. Carroll. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
42  Y. Davydov. 'Russia: policy analysis and options' in Russia: public attitudes and
expert assessment.p.257.
43  Some authors maintain that in geopolitical terms the current situation of Russia is
only comparable to that it was in the Middle Ages. "Also like in the Middle Ages,
Russia finds itself now removed from Europe. Not one but two belts of states sepa-
rate Russia from western Europe, the first belt consisting of Belarus, Ukraine and the
Baltic states, and the second one consisting of the former WTO allies of Eastern and
central Europe. The "window to Europe" opened by Peter the Great two centuries
ago has been, in a sense, closed again" ( Y. Davydov, op.cit., p. 255).Igor Leshoukov
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who support a more isolationist way of development has long roots in the
political culture and mentality of the people.
There is no consensus about the Russia-Europe relationship. Is Russia an
integral part of Europe, is it something different, say, Asian or Euro-Asian,
or does it have a certain autonomy within the European landscape? Does
Russia have the same interest as other Europeans or does it have its own
mission and its own destiny? Should Russia go in concert with the main
European nations or it should search the road of its own? In the view of
many analysts, the divisions over the sacred "European question" cause in-
consistency in Russia's European policy.
44
There is a substantial segment in Russian thinking which traditionally ad-
vocates the country's belonging to European civilization. In the 19th cen-
tury, the protagonists of this idea were known as "Westerners". During the
Soviet time, they were politically ousted and mockingly branded as
"bezrodnyje kosmopolity"
45. With the beginning of Perestroika the "West-
erners" regained their legacy, yet with a new name of "Democrats". For the
"democrats", Russia is part of Europe and the "democratic world" in gen-
eral, thus Russian interests should be identified within a common European
framework. It requires certain subordination of Russia's interests to the
European ones or at least the political will to reconcile its interests with
those of Europe. Gorbachev had tried this approach and achieved consider-
able progress in this way. However, the achievements proved insufficient,
and the process as such was not sustainable. The Gorbachevian policy
failed and was replaced with a much more reserved approach under Yelt-
sin.
Primakov's doctrine advocates the principles of the "multi-polar" world and
regards the Russian Federation as a self-standing entity and a power centre
like "Europe" (the EU), the USA, China and Japan. This logically implies
that Russia is regarded not as a part of Europe, but as a neighbouring actor
                                        
44 A. Zagorski, 'Russian and Europe', International Affairs (Moscow), 1:1993, pp. 43-
51.
45 Precise translation is diffiuclt, it stands for "cosmopolitans of no kith or kin".Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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who has its own interests and mission. It surely differs from the true isola-
tionist approach formulated by "Slavophils", yet, it follows comparable
patterns. The easiness with which Mr. Primakov was confirmed by the
State Duma dominated by the Communists supports this argument. Mr.
Primakov's beloved hero is the ambitious Prince Gorchakov who served the
Russian Empire as its Foreign Minister after its profound defeat in the Cri-
mean war (1853-56). According to Russia's incumbent prime-minister,
Prince Gorchakov teaches us an important lesson, namely how to retrieve
the international respect Russia once enjoyed. Russia should pursue an ac-
tive foreign policy, not confine itself to Europe and should defend its inter-
ests following the classical advice of Lord Palmerston.
46 The principle of
rapprochement at whatever price to the West is not acceptable.
47 It implic-
itly means application of the Realist logic to Russia's external policy
whereas the partnership with the EU is viewed not as an end in itself, but as
a means to counterbalance American dominance and regain lost influence
on the international arena. In this respect, Russia's official perspective of
Europe resembles its toward China. It, in effect, is also labelled as a "stra-
tegic partnership". This is one of the manifestations of how Russia turns
from "geopolitics" to "geoeconomics" in its foreign policy.
48
Summing up
Reflecting over the Russia-EU relationship, I intended to demonstrate the
uneasy confusion of economic and political realities which my country fa-
ces today. Presented somewhat provocatively, the dominant dilemma could
be reviewed as follows. One the one hand, Russia is an important trading
                                        
46  Lord Palmerston: ' We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our
interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow".
47  'Russia in the world politics' (in Russian). A speech given by E. Primakov on the
occasion of the 200 anniversary of A.M. Gorchakov and given at Moscow state in-
stitute of international relations (MGIMO), Moscow, 28.04.1998.
48 On the necessity to link the external policy to the Russia's diplomacy priorities see
the President's Decree of 12 March 1996 'On the guiding role of the MFA of Russia
in implementing the single external policy of the Russian Federation'.Igor Leshoukov
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nation
49 and it needs to be enrolled into a favourable commercial regime,
represented primarily by the WTO,  its external relations must be further
liberalised, with the EU as its main partner in this regard. On the other
hand, this approach will lead to severe shocks and disproportions in Rus-
sia's economic development which the incumbent government is unlikely to
afford politically. At the same time, if the current situation persists, it will
lead the country nowhere. There is a continuous slowdown in the economy
and drastic social frustration in Russia. It can find nothing better than to
further trade its natural resources for consumer goods. This policy only
delays the dilemma's resolution, and it does not provide for sustainable de-
velopment. It is tempting to assume that Russia should stop its opening to
the world markets and return to protectionist practices to safeguard the in-
ternal market and creeping industry. Given the background of hurt national
dignity and past legacies, this assumption finds numerous adherents while
the crisis deepens and further inaction brings more trouble to the ordinary
people. Obeying western advice and withdrawal from the international po-
sitions the Soviet Union once had are easy escapes in the eyes of both the
public and the ruling establishment. In my view, this assumption is based
on a flawed premise. Russia's real troubles - legal uncertainty, criminaliza-
tion of politics and society, unmatched corruption - are not the results of
economic liberalization and dismissal of costly confrontations with the
West. Nevertheless, in order to recognise it, the Russian government needs
to change the reference framework it has been applying since 1993. With a
budget only twice as big as that of Finland, it is unrealistic to dream of the
role of superpower. The remaining nuclear weapons could serve sooner as
a last resort blackmail instrument than a power factor. Still, the country
needs more time to accommodate itself with this cooling reality. Today,
when the crisis has ruined the tiny achievements of reforms, Russia falls
deeper into the waves of protectionist policy, risky endeavours of foreign
policy and balancing games with the West. Under such conditions, certain
deterioration in Russian relations with the European Union is not impossi-
ble. Yet, these chances are relatively small, since the Russian Federation
                                        
49  This is the expression of Leon Brittan (L. Brittan, op.cit) which underlines the signi-
ficant contribution of international commerce to Russia's GDP.Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
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clearly realises the risk of losing the partnership into which it had invested
so much in its attempt to counterbalance the uni-polar world system domi-
nated by the USA.Igor Leshoukov
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Annex
Annex 1. Dynamics of Russsia's trade with the EU (ecu bn)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Russian export 17,6 21,4 21,9 22,9 25,2
Russian import 13,2 14,4 16,1 19,0 22,9
Turn-over 30,8 35,8 38,0 41,9 48,1
Balance 4,4 7,0 5,8 3,9 2,3
Source: Russian statistics
Annex 2. Commodity structure of USSR/Russia's trade with the EU
1990 1995 1996 1997
Exports
Food, beverages and tobacco 1,1 1,6 1,7 1,6
Raw materials 9,4 10,6 9,1 9,6
Energy 56,6 35,9 46,1 42,1
Chemical products 4,2 7,5 6,0 5,4
Machinery and transport equipment 3,6 2,7 2,3 1,5
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 10,9 27,9 20,7 22,1
Other 13,2 13,8 14,0 17,0
Total (ecu bn) 19,7 21,5 23,2 26,6
Imports
Food, beverages and tobacco 11,7 21,0 21,0 20,3
Raw materials 1,4 2,0 1,7 2,2
Energy 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,5
Chemical products 11,6 8,3 10,3 10,8
Machinery and transport equipment 43,7 37,5 34,4 35,3
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 27,5 28,9 29,7 28,3
Other 3,5 1,8 2,4 2,6
Total (ecu bn) 14,9 16,1 19,1 25,1
Source: B. Ardy (1998); Percentage sharesBeyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives of European Integration
31
Annex 3. Foreign direct investment to Russia (US$ mn)
1993 1994 1995 $ per
capita,
1995
cumulative
1989-1995
$ per capita
cumulative
Share of
GDP,
1995
400 1000 1500 10 3100 21 0,40%
Source: EBRD Report,1996
Annex 4. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations against
Soviet/Russian imports initiated by the EC.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1 2 - 3 1 3 1
Source: European Commission. General Report, 1996
Annex 5. EU Aid to Central and Eastern Europe
Phare Tacis
A C D A C D
1990 500 495 171 0 0 0
1991 775 774 284 400 397 0
1992 1016 1013 436 420 419 32
1993 1011 1099 521 475 472 180
1994 989 973 723 470 470 300
1995 1168 43 289 507 23 130
A - Appropriations (the maximum amount available)
C - Committments (the total of potential expenditure on approved projects)
D - Disbersements (actual expenditure)Igor Leshoukov
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Annex 6. St. Petersburg citizen's judgement on the necessity
of western aid to Russia.
Aid is not
needed
Difficult
to answer
Aid is
needed
Percentage of
respondents in
the sample
Sample as a whole 46,3 11,9 41,8 100
Market economy
supporters
42,0 11,5 46,5 73,3
Its opponents 69,0 9,7 21,2 10,5
Source: Ogylvy Adams, Interim Report, 1995
Annex 7. Public Attitudes in Russia (situation)
Level of knowledge and understanding of Tacis virtually zero
Understanding of role of the EU is low
Attidues toward reform are mixed
Eroded belief in the role of state and its ability to initiate reforms
For those involved, Tacis means different things for different people
Source: Ogylvy Adams, Interim Report, 1995ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-26-0
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